even the convergence theory, by denying the very existence of an Altaic typology. For Japanese, he rejects all forms of Altaic, Korean, Austronesian, and, of course, the mixed language theories. In his view, Japanese and Kogury0 are in "an exclusive close genetic relationship" (p. 183).
Beckwith then tries to back up his theory with historical background and discuss at length the history and the archeology of Northeast Asia. Arguing for lexical and typological similarities with the Sino-Tibetan languages, he hypothesizes about ancient contacts and concludes that the Proto-JapaneseKogury0ic homeland was located in Southern China or Southeastern Asia. The Japanese-Kogury0ic speakers would have migrated to the North, some of them remaining on the continent to form the Puy0-Kogury0ic people in Manchuria and Korea, others moving by sea to Southern Korea and to the North of Kyushu, where they became the ancestors of the Japanese people.
Unfortunately, Beckwith's ambitious work is heavily flawed in many aspects, of which I will provide only a few examples. First, I deplore the general opacity of his methodology, since most of his reconstructions are his own, quite different from the ones adopted in mainstream Chinese (Baxter 1992; Sagart 1999; Starostin 1989 Starostin , 1998 Starostin -2003 and Japanese (Martin 1987) historical phonology, and it is unclear how they were arrived at. His comparisons thus use reconstructions that are too often problematic, sometimes simply incorrect, or, worse, just circular.
For instance, the mysterious Proto-Japanese (PJ) *mika < *miak 'eye' (p. 157) is simply teleological: the Hateruma form "min" (said ad hoc to go back to *mina) quoted as evidence is simply the regular reflex of Proto-Ryukyuan *me, with a lexicalized nasal suffix (Martin 1987: 74-75; Oyler 1997) . Similarly, the reconstructions of PJ *rmaj > ume 'plum' and *rmey > umi 'sea ' (pp. 146-47) are completely ad hoc. They are supported by neither internal nor comparative method, and such consonant clusters have never been posited for PJ. The Yaeyama form " m mi" quoted as evidence (p. 147) cannot be found in Hirayama's reference dictionary (1988: 139-40 ; Yaeyama dialects forms are recent loans from mainland dialects since plums don't grow there). Anyway, both words cannot be reconstructed with the same onset since umi doesn't exhibit the m-/ø-alternation of mume/ume in Japanese, and both words have completely different Ryukyuan reflexes (Shuri ?nmi 'plum' vs. ?umi 'sea'). Their putative Chinese sources don't exhibit an initial *r-in standard reconstructions either: 'plum' *mf (Baxter), *md (Starostin); 'sea' *hmf? (Baxter) , *smd? (Starostin).
Many words are also cut down into pseudo roots, although there is no internal evidence for a morphological boundary: the only argument for those segmentations seems to be that they make the comparisons look better. For example, the reduction of OJ naga 'long' to *na (p. 133), taka 'high' to *ta (pp. 136-37), or tgporu 'to pass through' to tg (p. 137, oddly reconstructed as *tewn) and their comparison with OKog cannot be accepted without justification.
It seems that all the above "reconstructions" are motivated only by the urge to provide them with an etymology: external comparison is privileged in detriment of internal evidence. Other quite irregular correspondences and derivations can also be found, with irregular forms too easily dubbed as "dialectal," and, for some of them, the author even confesses that "these phonological changes are almost completely unexplained" (p. 149).
Beckwith's comparisons also include a significant number of cases with questionable or unrealistic semantics. I am thus not convinced that OKog *t7ü 'to shoot with a bow' should be compared with OJ tgbu (reduced ad hoc to *tö) 'to fly' despite Beckwith's claim that simply "arrows fly" (p. 140). The most puzzling comparison is found on p.143, where OKog *yatsi 'mother' is said to be cognate with OJ yatukwo 'slave.' I also find unpersuasive the too-easy and too-quick dismissal of the nonJaponic etymologies for Kogury0 words (Itabashi [2004] provides a much more thorough list of Altaic, Korean, and even Austronesian etymologies by various authors). Too quick is also the conclusion that the language underlying the toponyms represents the actual language of Kogury0 and the rejection of opposite views. The exact nature of the source language of the place names remains problematic in spite of Beckwith's arguments, and this has led some scholars to label it cautiously "pseudo-Kogury0."
In addition, many of the phonetic fonts are misprinted, and the mixing of IPA characters and conventional transcriptions can be in some cases confusing.
In conclusion, Beckwith's book is a valuable attempt to have a new look at the Kogury0 fragments, within the broader scale of a global ethnolinguistic study of Ancient Eastern Asia. Nevertheless, its too many methodological shortcomings forbid us to accept Beckwith's reconstructions and conclusions, although it is quite clear that some of the Kogury0 place names indeed represent in all likelihood a language related to Japanese that was once spoken in the center of the Korean peninsula.
Thomas Pellard
Paris, France Kang, who teaches government at Dartmouth College, posits that North Korea has not come close to starting a war because it is weak and deterrence works. As it grows weaker, "the chances for war or unprovoked provocative acts becomes even slimmer." Having a few crude nuclear devices will not change that. Analysts who view North Korea as a threat, he says, smuggle in unwarranted assumptions about the irrationality of North Korea's leadership.
Instead, Kang contends, "North Korea is truly trying to reach a modus vivendi with the rest of the world." Its reforms are real: it "is opening up and many of the changes are becoming irreversible." He rests his case for engagement on accelerating this transformation: "We should encourage this trend, not hinder it." Yet, why should Americans care more about how North Korea runs its economy than about its nuclear weapons programs? Any rationale for engagement that does not confront this question is ultimately unpersuasive.
Kang sidesteps the question by quoting Marcus Noland's assertion that "through a policy of engagement either Pyongyang will evolve toward a less threatening regime, or engagement will undermine the ideological basis of the Kim Jong-il regime and eventually cause its collapse." Skeptics might wonder whether the regime will go quietly into that good night-or might worry whether an arms race might break out in Northeast Asia in the meantime.
North Korea has genuine security concerns, Kang argues. A policy of pres-
